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On February 25, 2012, the Taliban made what was perhaps one of 
the most significant statements of their decade-long insurgency 
against the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and the Afghan government. On this date, one of the group’s 
members who had infiltrated the Afghan security forces viciously 
murdered two senior U.S. military officers within one of the most 
secure locations in Afghanistan, a fortified vault containing work 
spaces for handling classified material at the Afghan Ministry of 
Interior in Kabul.1 This incident, along with a string of other bold, 
spectacular attacks and infiltrations that have targeted security 
forces and high-level officials sends a strong message that the 
Taliban can act with impunity at the times and places of their 
choosing and has cast doubt over the ability of the Afghan 
government and international forces to provide security across the 
country.2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hamid Shalizi, “Afghan Policeman Suspect in Killing of U.S. Officers:  
Sources,” Reuters, February 26, 2012. [http://goo.gl/b2bCH] 
2 “The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” International Crisis Group 
While the Taliban have relentlessly endeavored to terrorize the 
centers of Afghanistan’s political and administrative power, they 
have simultaneously worked to re-brand themselves as a kinder, 
gentler, more inclusive organization to the Afghan people and have 
sought to improve their political capital as  members of the 
international community by establishing a diplomatic office in 
Qatar.3  These initiatives may seem quite divergent from the 
Taliban’s campaign of destabilization and intimidation, yet these 
contrasting lines of operation are highly complementary because 
they portray a clear, strong message to both the Afghan people and 
to the world that the Taliban are capable of returning to power and 
presenting Afghanistan with a credible, acceptable alternative to the 
current government.    
The War in Afghanistan has always been a war of narratives.  
The United States has seemingly recognized this, with former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen 
emphasizing the importance of strategic communication in an era 
where “the lines between strategic, operational and tactical are 
blurred beyond distinction.”4  However, the U.S. military and the 
Afghan government have continually failed to offer a credible 
narrative that resonates with the Afghan people. The Taliban, on 
the other hand, have crafted a strong, simple, and culturally 
relevant campaign of information operations (IO) to coerce and 
control the Afghan populace, fully recognizing that perceptions of 
strength and progress have always been crucial to determining the 
trust and confidence of Afghanistan’s tribes and power brokers.5 
The forthcoming withdrawal of U.S. troops has given the Taliban 
further opportunity to develop their storyline, and recent Taliban 
statements and actions show the group’s intent to amplify, 
corroborate, and elaborate past messages. It is now evident that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Asia Report 27 (2011):  8 [ http://goo.gl/OWTKC ]. 
3 “Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Eid al-Fitr Address for 2012,” Grand Strategy:  
The View from Oregon [http://goo.gl/FxWfJ]; “Taliban Will Open Office in Qatar 
for Peace Talks,”  USA Today, January 4, 2012 [http://goo.gl/VfHCo]. 
4 Arturo Munoz, "US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan:  
Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010," RAND Corporation, 
National Defense Research Institute (2012):  4 [http://goo.gl/PJFjn].  
5 Ibid.,” 4; Tim Foxley, "The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is 
the Afghan Insurgency Communicating and what is it Saying?," Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (2007):  2 [http://goo.gl/9iUlo]. 
Taliban’s narrative is comprised of the following components, 
which the Taliban delivers through strategic communication 
platforms and complimentary actions:6----------------------------- 
  
1. The Taliban’s victory in this cosmic conflict is inevitable, 
and Afghanistan will soon be returned to their control; 
2. Islam cannot be defeated; 
3. The Taliban are national heroes and willing to sacrifice 
for Allah and country; 
4. Afghans have a long and honorable history of defeating 
invading foreign infidels; 
5. Foreign invaders and their Afghan puppet government are 
attempting to destroy Afghan religions and traditions; and 
6. The Taliban will implement an Islamic regime that is 




Since the Taliban began to re-group and gain momentum as an 
insurgency in 2003, the organization has mastered the employment 
of a unique and highly efficient information operations (IO) 
campaign that deeply resonates with rural Afghanistan’s deeply 
traditional and religious society. The Taliban have influenced the 
Afghan population through simple, coherent messages expressed in 
its official statements, organizational correspondence, and 
propaganda delivered in various forms that range from traditional 
folklore to the latest social-networking technology.  Equally 
important, the Taliban’s recent initiatives and combat operations, 
especially with regard to their locations and objectives, reveal how 
the group is attempting to align its actions with its words. 
The Taliban have crafted their narrative to broadly appeal to the 
three primary social identities that most Afghans share:  religious 
(Islamic), cultural, and political (see Figure 4.1). These three 
distinct categories of identity have various overlapping tenants 
shown below, which the Taliban target with a variety of themes 
aimed at delegitimizing or discrediting the current U.S.-backed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict:  An 
Introduction to Taliban Stories and their Delivery Systems,” Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, September 2011, 5, http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs. 
Afghan government  and convincing or coercing the Afghan 
population to favor the Taliban movement.7 The Taliban have also 
been particularly successful at bolstering the effectiveness of its 
messages by employing anecdotes that capture commonly-held 
grievances, which the group ascertains by collecting intelligence at 
the local level.8 
The attempts of ISAF and the Afghan government to promote a 
narrative of progress and democracy have been unsuccessful in 
competing with the Taliban’s influence over the Afghan population 
because the United States and the Karzai regime have consistently 
failed to provide a credible vision for Afghanistan’s future. This 
fiasco began when the United States opted for a light presence of  
foreign troops outside of Kabul after its initial invasion This led to 
an environment in the rural areas that was characterized by a 
complete lack of security, absence of the rule of law, and the 
nonexistence of essential social services. The 2001 Bonn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict,” 6. 
8 Ben Brandt, “The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counter-
intelligence,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue 6, June 2011, 19-23.  
Figure 4.1  Shared Social Identities of Afghans 
Conference also completely disregarded the history of Afghan 
institutions, setting the framework for a presidential system of 
government that is incompatible with traditional forms of Afghan 
governance and feelings toward legitimacy.9 Against this backdrop, 
the Taliban’s familiar appeals to their target audience’s strong 
religious beliefs, cultural attachment to the values of honor and 
shame, and even feelings of nationalism have bolstered the group’s 
standing as a viable alternative to the current government.10  
The Taliban’s IO initiatives have further thrived due to the 
failure of the United States to understand the historic, cultural, and 
religious dynamics of its operating environment.  Despite spending 
eleven years in Afghanistan, U.S. forces still have not been able to 
craft a message that is appropriate for its audience or that can be 
expressed in a manner free of condescending cultural bias.11  This 
has particularly been true when dealing with the Pashtun 
populations, whose unique language, history, and culture revolving 
around the Pashtunwali concepts of honor and shame, revenge, 
pride, loyalty, sincerity, respect for elders, and hospitality.12 This 
leaves U.S. IO themes, which a recent RAND corporation study has 
defined as “denying safe havens to terrorists” and “denouncing the 
Taliban as un-Islamic,” falling flat. 13  Worse yet, the violation of 
Pashtunwali sensitivities occurring when U.S. forces conduct night 
raids, search homes where women are present, fail to deliver on 
promises, speak harshly to village elders, or cause civilian 
casualties, have caused a gap to grow between Americans and the 
Afghan populations and have intensified perceptions that the U.S.-
led coalition does not care whether it kills civilians or insurgents.14  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Thomas Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency:  
Causes, Actors an [Sic] Approaches to 'Talks',” Afghanistan Analysts Network 
(2009):  6-7 [http://goo.gl/Fji6w]. 
10 Ibid., 2; Florian Broschk, "Inciting the Believers to Fight:  A Closer Look at 
the Rhetoric of the Afghan Jihad,” Afghan Analysts Network (2011):  7 
[http://goo.gl/J8J0a].   
11 Larry LeGree, “Thoughts on the Battle for the Minds: IO and COIN in the 
Pashtun Belt,” Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas (2010):  
23 [http://goo.gl/Bjkl6].  
12 Lutz Rzheak, "Doing Pashto: Pashtunwali as the Ideal of Honourable 
Behaviour and Tribal Life among the Pashtuns," Afghan Analysts Network 
(2011):  1-22 [http://goo.gl/cHLKO].   
13 Munoz, "US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan,” 31-91. 
14 “The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” i- ii. 
In contrast, the Taliban have held the advantage of being able to 
integrate into rural Afghan society to spread the group’s message, 
as its members come from the same tribes, speak the same 
language, and deeply understand Pashtun tribal codes and culture.15 
 
Spreading the Word:  How the Taliban Effectively Uses a Wide 
Range of Delivery Systems for its Narrative 
 
The Taliban have heavily used a multitude of widely available 
print and video media to support their IO campaign, and the group 
is also increasingly relying on the effective use of the latest Internet 
and social networking technology to reach Afghanistan’s increasing 
urban populations, youth, and international audiences. The Taliban 
have maintained a website called Al Emarah since mid-2005, 
which continues to be the main source of the group’s IO aimed at 
both domestic and international audiences.16 The organization has 
also conspicuously outpaced the Afghan government in using 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to spread its messages. Even 
when these popular companies attempt to block Taliban sites from 
operation, individuals quickly migrate the propaganda to new 
accounts. The use of these technology-based platforms will surely 
increase with the expansion of Internet access in Afghanistan.17 
Recognizing that Afghanistan’s remote rural populations lack 
the ability to receive and understand modern media, the Taliban 
have also been incredibly innovative and successful in leveraging 
traditional, low-tech, and cost-effective methods of spreading their 
narrative. The group has widely used shabnamah (night letters), 
which have historically served as tools for local leaders in rural 
Afghanistan to influence villagers by using folklore, illustrations, 
and poetry to convey a message. In a similar way, poetry and 
chants called taranas, which set well-known Afghan tales and 
history to refraining melodies, have manipulated the sentiments of 
people by appealing to collective memories that fit Taliban themes 
and capture the organization’s guidance and instructions.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Foxley, "The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities,” 13. 
16 “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?,” International Crisis 
Group Asia Report 158 (2008):  15 [http://goo.gl/PfAMG]. 
17 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Narratives in Conflict,” 29-32. 
Taliban have used all of these deeply-rooted cultural forms of 
expression to both inspire and intimidate Afghans, encouraging 
them not to cooperate with the international forces or the Afghan 
government.18 
Finally, the Taliban leadership has revealed its narrative through 
its sporadic official communications to its organization members 
and the international community. From time to time, the group has 
issued formal codes of conduct called layeha, and the most recent 
version, released in 2010, reveals the image that the organization 
attempts to project as it anticipates growing influence and power in 
Afghanistan.19 The Taliban’s enigmatic leader, Mullah Omar, 
reiterates and expounds upon these messages in his annual Eid al-
Fitr statements, with the recently released 2012 statement offering 
its Afghan audience fresh and encouraging guidance with regard to 
the coming withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country.20  
 
Islamic Themes of the Taliban Narrative 
 
Ever since the Taliban re-emerged as an insurgency, they have 
consistently pursued a narrative of jihad in support of their call for 
an exit of foreign troops, the dismantling of the Afghan 
government, and the return of an Islamic emirate.21 This theme of 
the Taliban narrative has attempted to unite Afghans, loyal to their 
faith, in an ongoing battle against unbelievers to carry on the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad’s battles against the pagans in 
Mecca and the mujihadeen’s fight against Soviet invaders during 
the 1980s.22 The Taliban portray U.S. troops as kaferan 
(unbelievers) and the Afghan government as oppressors that misuse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Thomas H. Johnson and Ahmad Waheed, "Analyzing Taliban Taranas 
(Chants): An Effective Afghan Propaganda Artifact," Small Wars & Insurgencies 
22, no. 1 (2011): 3 [http://goo.gl/qBLKu]; “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War 
of Words?,” 12. 
19 Thomas H. Johnson and Matthew C. DuPee,"Analysing the New Taliban 
Code of Conduct (Layeha): An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and 
Strategies of the Afghan Taliban,"Central Asian Survey 31, no. 1 (2012):  77-81 
[http://goo.gl/Scv4M].  
20 “Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Eid al-Fitr Address for 2012.” 
21 Foxley, "The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities,” 3-6. 
22 Broschk, "Inciting the Believers to Fight,” 3.   
power and violate the will of God.23 The following Taliban-
produced tarana titled Da Kufar sara Jang dai (Fight With 
Infidels) clearly captures this call for jihad and is an example of 
how the Taliban incorporate religious rhetoric effectively into their 
messages:24 
 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
Oh Brothers, please keep your patience high and make your hearts’ 
passion fresh 
Oh Brothers, please keep your patience high and make your hearts’ 
passion fresh 
We will win starting from Iraq, Palestine to Arianna  
We will win starting from Iraq, Palestine to Arianna  
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will definitely win the war over infidels 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
I and you will win if it is today or tomorrow 
The fight is tough but it is easy for God 
The fight is tough but it is easy for God 
As Moses did, we will also win from Pariah [international forces] 
 
Appealing to a Muslim’s duty to protect Islam is a powerful 
motivator among rural Afghans and a very effective means for the 
Taliban to gain recruits. The Taliban’s use of Islamic rhetoric to 
assign foreign forces and their Afghan supporters with the titles of 
religious enemies is also an extremely strong and compelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 3-4. 
24 “Da Kufar sara Jang dai (Fight with infidels),” Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan Official Website,  http://alemarah-iea.net/Taranee.  This website 
attributes this song to a singer named Shaheed Samiullah Shahid. 
	  
storyline. These narratives, when adopted and spread by Mullahs—
who hold a near monopoly of power over religion in Afghanistan’s 
rural areas— present the Taliban with powerful, well-coordinated 
tools for manipulation.25    
 The Taliban have also used the concept of martyrdom to 
support a narrative that Islam cannot be defeated and to link the 
Taliban’s fight against ISAF forces and the Afghan government to 
the Afghan history and traditions of fighting against foreign 
infidels.  The Taliban have applied the term shaheed (martyr) to 
any of their fighters killed in combat against international or 
Afghan government forces, suggesting that those who support the 
Taliban will be rewarded in heaven for their actions. Nearly all 
Taliban literature contains obituaries of Taliban shaheed, and the 
Taliban also proliferate music and poetry to venerate suicide-
bombers and Taliban commanders killed during battle. This 
narrative has also served as a highly-effective recruitment tool, 
especially for attracting suicide-bombers from the madrassa 
networks in Pakistan.  
 Finally, the promotion of Afghanistan as an Islamic state 
based on infallible sharia law remains a key religious theme of the 
Taliban narrative. While Afghans exhibit a wide range of religious 
attitudes, Islam is promoted by the Taliban as a unifying identity 
that should be imposed on the conduct of governance. The Taliban 
particularly advocate sharia law as an alternative to the ineffective, 
complex, inefficient and corrupt legal and administrative systems 
of the Kabul-based government, which are also culturally foreign to 
Afghanistan’s rural areas. These aspects of the Taliban narrative 
have been considerably popular amongst large segments of Afghan 
society that were previously opposed to Afghan rule.26 
 
Cultural Themes of the Taliban Narrative 
 
The cultural themes of the Taliban narrative are heavily 
centered on the prevailing ethics of the Pashtunwali tribal code, but 
are also representative of many common values held by all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict,” 8; 
“Taliban Propaganda,” 23-4. 
26 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict,” 9; 
“Taliban Propaganda,” 24. 
Afghans. First, the Taliban exploit appeals to pride and honor in 
messages that present all Afghans as victims of foreign 
transgressions and corrupt governance. The group also employs 
themes that invoke collective memories of Afghanistan’s history of 
pursuing independence and resisting foreign occupation as a means 
to rally support against ISAF soldiers and their client Karzai 
regime. Finally, the Taliban have promoted the enduring desire 
among Afghans to preserve long-standing traditions of local 
governance and tribal justice systems to discredit the central 
government’s rule and bolster support for the Taliban’s alternative 
institutions.27    
The Taliban narrative takes effective advantage of the concepts 
of nang (pride and honor) and ghariat (esteem and pride derived 
from courage), which are driving forces behind the actions of both 
individuals and groups within Afghan society. Any transgression or 
embarrassment that infringes on one’s nang prompts a call for an 
immediate act of revenge. Consequently, any instances of improper 
trespassing into villages and households during raids, collateral 
damage inflicted by errant air-strikes, or the touching of Afghan 
women and shackling of Afghan men in front of their families 
during searches become sources of Taliban propaganda that push 
wronged individuals and honor-bound communities into joining 
efforts against international forces and the Afghan government. The 
obligation that Afghans, especially tribal Pashtuns, feel toward 
seeking revenge is a tremendous boost to the Taliban’s reservoir of 
manpower and attracts volunteers who may not otherwise support 
the movement.28   
The Taliban narrative also invokes themes of resistance and 
independence that draw upon the well-developed collective 
memories of Afghans repulsing a long list of numerically-superior, 
technologically-advanced, foreign invaders. These themes regularly 
play on the notion that the Afghan people have always been 
systematically victimized by foreign occupiers who want to corrupt 
and destroy their religion and traditional way of life. Against this 
back-drop, the Taliban portray themselves as defenders of 
Afghanistan in a cosmic battle of victim versus aggressor, freedom-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict,” 9-10. 
28 Ibid., 11. 
fighter against occupier, and Muslim versus infidel. The Afghan 
people then logically conclude that the Taliban’s victory is 
inevitable based on their religious beliefs and their understanding 
of historical precedents.29   
 Finally, Taliban messages exploit commonly-held grievances 
about the administration of the Afghan government’s judicial 
system and contend that such institutions are the work of foreign 
invaders who intend to destroy the cultural fabric of Afghan society 
by creating a dishonest, extractive government. 30 In reality, the 
greatest challenge facing governments throughout Afghan history 
has been the ability to effectively impose a centralized legal system 
upon local communities that have historically preferred traditional 
methods of regulating behavior and resolving problems through 
consensus. The current justice system, in addition to being a 
foreign concept to most Afghans, is effectively absent in rural parts 
of the country due to insecurity, lack of state capacity, and rampant 
corruption. Consequently, these institutions have been largely 
replaced by the Taliban’s own mobile court system, which offers 
swift and fair rulings based on sharia law that are administered by 
Taliban-affiliated qaziyan (judges). The Taliban’s success in 
offering a justice system that is preferred over the courts operated 
by the central government is a huge discredit to the Karzai regime 
and offers tremendous support to the narrative that the Taliban 
preserve both Islamic and Afghan traditions.31 
 
Political Themes of the Taliban Narrative 
 
The political themes of the Taliban narrative have consistently 
sought to cultivate Afghan nationalism and to portray the Taliban 
as national heroes. As previously mentioned, the Taliban have 
attempted to construct a national identity based on common Islamic 
beliefs and collective memories of historical events that are 
commonly understood by all Afghans. The group proposes that this 
national identity is being attacked by foreign invaders and a puppet 
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30 Johnson and Waheed, "Analyzing Taliban Taranas,” 3; Broschk, "Inciting 
the Believers to Fight,” 3-4. 
31 Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, “Narratives in Conflict,” 12. 
government in a way that parallels the Anglo-Afghan wars and the 
Soviet invasion. The Taliban have also been very careful to appear 
representative of all of Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic groups by 
avoiding a Pashtun-centric messaging strategy and by explicitly 
reaching out to minorities, such as the Hazara Shiites, who were 
victims of discrimination and ethnic cleansing under the former 
Taliban government. 32  Mullah Omar has even made the consistent 
point of articulating that “Afghanistan is the homeland of all 
Afghans” in his annual Eid statements.33 The nationalist aspects of 
the Taliban narrative send the message that the organization intends 
to be inclusive and representative of all Afghans, making the 
prospect of regaining control of the entire country believable. This, 
in turn, bolsters the chances for both tacit and material support 
from the international community. 
 
Target Audiences of Taliban IO 
 
While the Taliban have continually focused their IO campaign 
and actions toward bolstering the support of the rural Afghan 
populations that comprise the center of gravity for their insurgency, 
the group recognizes that its ability to reach its organizational goals 
rests on the capacity to influence a variety of domestic and 
international target audiences. These different audiences represent a 
vast spectrum of religions, cultures, political agendas, and attitudes 
toward the group. Consequently, the Taliban employ unique 
messaging strategies with specifically-tailored objectives, themes, 
and delivery systems for each group that they attempts to engage.  
Although the narrative of the Taliban remains consistent, the 
messages portrayed may vary greatly34 (See Appendices 1-5). 
Taliban messages that target local Afghan constituents differ 
according to whether the receiving community is supportive of, 
opposed to, or neutral toward the organization. When addressing 
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local populations that support their agenda, the Taliban tout and 
exaggerate their successes in battle, praise the martyrs that have 
sacrificed for the group’s cause, and aim to improve recruitment.  
Messages to communities that are loyal to the Afghan government 
have been mainly threatening and intimidating, although the group 
has recently offered reconciliation and amnesty to those who join 
the group.35  Finally, the Taliban targets neutral or undecided 
groups through a messaging strategy that attempts to convince 
these audiences of the organization’s rising power and credibility as 
a preferable alternative to the current government. Taliban 
commanders often direct intelligence collection efforts at these 
communities to identify local grievances that could bolster the 
effectiveness of the group’s messages. Taliban messages to local 
populations are most often relayed in Pashto, are relevant to the 
local populations, and rely heavily on the consistent religious, 
cultural, and political themes of the organization’s narrative.36   
While attempting to influence the populations and leaders of 
neighboring and Muslim countries, the Taliban rely almost 
exclusively on Islamic themes calling for those audiences to unite 
with fellow Muslims in support of jihad against infidels who intend 
to oppress and corrupt Muslims throughout the world. In 
addressing Pakistani audiences, the Taliban particularly promotes 
themes that encourage cross-border solidarity and the unity of 
effort, while offering battlefield updates of current Taliban exploits 
in Afghanistan.37  When expressing its narrative to its Muslim 
neighbors, the Taliban typically translates its messages into either 
Arabic or Urdu.The propaganda usually consists of overtly jihadist 
videos that depict provocative sermons or battlefield scenes set to 
Quaranic verses and calls to prayer.38 
 The Taliban even have a messaging strategy to target the 
populations of the United States and its allies. These messages are 
delivered in English via an array of Western media outlets and 
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social networking sites and carry very little emphasis on the 
religious themes of the Taliban narrative.  Instead, messages 
focused toward the West attempt to present the people of 
Afghanistan as victims of physical aggression and cultural 
imperialism, highlight the tragic devastation and loss of life 
throughout the country, and portray the war efforts and the backing 
of the corrupt Karzai regime as shameful wastes of blood and 
treasure. Finally, Taliban messages oriented toward the West 
attempt to create tensions and fissures in the relationships between 
the United States and its allies by implying that the leaders of 
European countries are blindly submitting to the interest of the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda.39 
 
Recent Evolutions of the Taliban Messages 
 
Recently, the Taliban narrative has evolved to increase the 
group’s political capital in light of the impending withdrawal of 
international forces from Afghanistan in 2014.  The Taliban intend 
for the themes supporting this aspect of their narrative to solidify 
the sense of inevitability that the group will return to power and to 
present aspects of the organization’s plans for governance. These 
messages are directed at both the Afghan people and the 
international community, and present the organization as liberation 
movement that is seizing the initiative from the deflating foreign 
presence in the country. The narrative further casts the Taliban as a 
more moderate and tolerant incarnation of themselves, which is 
dedicated to truly Islamic and fair principles that represent a 
favorable alternative to the current Kabul government. Next, the 
evolved narrative aggressively seeks to bolster the group’s standing 
among Muslim countries and international organizations. Finally, 
the narrative continues to sternly warn against cooperation with 
U.S. forces or the Afghan government, but offers a much more 
compelling promise of reconciliation to those who join Taliban 
movement at this critical juncture.40    
 The most telling and recent evidence for the Taliban’s newly-
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evolved narrative is present in Mullah Omar’s latest Eid al-Fitr 
message, released on August 16, 2012. In the message, Omar 
presents the U.S. forces in Afghanistan as a defeated adversary, 
plagued by increasing casualties, loss of key terrain, insider attacks, 
economic hardships, and waning support from both American 
citizens and the international community. While he does not 
declare victory outright, Omar clearly projects that the will of Allah 
and a unified Afghan nation have made the presence of foreign 
troops in the country untenable. He labels initiatives such as the 
transition of authority to the “Kabul powerless Administration,” the 
recent bi-lateral Strategic Cooperation Agreement, and the 
conference of international aid donors as ruses intended to hide 
American defeat while propping up a “sagging and ill regime” in 
Kabul.41 Omar then carefully lays out his vision for the future of 
Afghanistan, describing an Islamic emirate that “is the homeland of 
All Afghans,” fights corruption by issuing government positions on 
the basis of merit, highly values education, offers “legitimate rights 
to women,” and focuses on development of the country.42 Next, he 
offers a compelling invitation to members of the current Kabul 
government and security forces to “join the ranks of Mujahideen,” 
warning that “the day is not far away that the invading enemy will 
flee Afghanistan.”43 Finally, Mullah Omar urges the Muslim world 
“to come forward in all-sided support of the Afghan miserable 
people in their struggle of liberation and salvation from atrocities,” 
and insists that the Taliban will pursue a foreign policy that seeks 
strong, positive relations with its neighbors and countries 
throughout the world.44 While none of the components of this 
narrative stray from the Taliban’s consistent religious, political, and 
cultural themes, they clearly provide a much stronger emphasis on 
the future and are much more noticeably aimed at gaining the 
acceptance of the narrative’s varied audience. 
 The Taliban’s most recent layeha, or code of conduct, is an 
inter-organizational message that Mullah Omar issued to his 
followers, which also soundly contributes to all components of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




group’s narrative. Although Omar issued the latest layeha in 2010, 
he was clearly seeking to address growing momentum in the 
Taliban’s preparation for the exit of foreign troops, improving 
public relations, and providing a credible alternative to governance. 
First of all, the layeha seeks to formalize procedures for 
consolidating power after an imminent withdrawal of U.S. forces, 
provides guidelines for accepting the surrender of Afghan 
government employees and security forces, and presents specific 
instructions for navigating potential reconciliation efforts by the 
Kabul government. Next, the new code of conduct aggressively 
tries to provide measures for increasing public support by curbing 
Taliban abuses and criminal activity against their local populations, 
outlawing offensive practices such as the use of young dancing 
boys for entertainment and sexual activity, limiting damage to 
civilians and private property, and prohibiting kidnap for ransom. 
Finally, the layeha focuses on improving the institutions of the 
Taliban organization by attempting to align and unify the actions of 
district and provincial shadow governors with the Taliban’s 
leadership, improving communication networks, and strengthening 
the importance of the group’s popular court systems and local 
political commissions. The themes of the new code of conduct 
significantly enhance the Taliban’s narrative by providing a 
concrete vision for the future, their efforts to improve their public 
image, and their urgency to improve the capability to govern.45 
While the content of the layeha may not have been explicitly 
directed at the Afghan population, its public release reinforces the 
Taliban’s official statements and IO.   
 
Supporting the Narrative with Actions 
 
As actions on the ground often occur more frequently than the 
release of propaganda or official statements, analysis of the 
Taliban’s activities and the focus of their combat operations is 
equally important for determining their narrative. Actions 
dramatically enhance or nullify the effectiveness of words, and this 
is especially true in a country where constant conflict for over thirty 
years has greatly diminished the prospects for easily influencing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Johnson and DuPee,"Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct,” 78-87. 
trust and confidence of the people. In Afghanistan, gaining the 
support of local leaders and power brokers is the key to victory, and 
allegiance always falls to the group that the population perceives as 
having the highest likelihood of victory.46 
 The past emphasis of Taliban actions focused on controlling 
and intimidating the local populations where they operated. On top 
of threatening violence against anyone found collaborating with 
U.S. forces or the Afghan government, much of the group’s efforts 
in the areas they controlled remained focused on enforcing strict 
social policies, such as the unpopular ban on music.47 Attacks on 
schools were also widespread, especially those institutions that 
educated girls and used textbooks issued by the new Afghan 
government. Mullah Omar even sanctioned these violent acts in the 
Taliban’s 2006 layeha, resulting in the deaths of dozens of students 
and teachers that year.48 These harsh actions of the Taliban, 
however, were never effective in allowing the group to gain vast 
public support. Ultimately, Mullah Omar issued a fatwa giving 
latitude to the Taliban’s local commanders and administrators to 
implement policies in accordance with the desires of the local 
populations. Since then, the Taliban have been very effective in 
addressing the needs of people wherever the group operates, and 
the legitimacy of the organization as an alternative to the corrupt 
Kabul government has grown tremendously as a result.49 
 Recent Taliban actions have focused on leveraging gains of 
strength and legitimacy to consolidate power throughout the 
country and to win the support in the portions of Afghanistan that 
previously opposed their rule. First, the Taliban have exhibited a 
hastening urgency to gain control of areas around Kabul. To 
accomplish this, they have sought to prevent the government from 
extending its security reach by infiltrating Afghan security forces 
and committing bold assassination attempts against elected 
officials. Additional attacks within Kabul itself attempt to achieve 
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psychological effects on both domestic and international audiences 
by gaining media attention. This has raised the uncertainty around 
doing business for foreign investors and diplomatic missions.50  
Next, the Taliban have steadily increased their operations in the 
North, aiming to increase their legitimacy by controlling areas that 
are largely non-Pashtun. While conservative mullahs in these areas 
have always shown some sympathy to the Taliban agenda because 
of the tendency for the Afghan government to challenge the 
clergy’s traditional powers with modernization efforts, the Taliban 
have grown in popularity among a wider Tajik and Uzbek audience 
due to rampant dissatisfaction with government corruption and a 
hatred for local strongmen that live above the law.51    
 The Taliban have also taken action to improve and expand 
their administration activities, while curbing practices that had 
offended so much of Afghanistan’s population in the past. The 
most successful of the Taliban’s administrative initiatives has 
easily been their shadow court system, and both the 2009 and 2010 
versions of the layeha give guidance for growing and reinforcing 
this institution. As previously discussed, sharia-based courts have 
dramatically increased the Taliban’s popularity and political capital 
across the country by supplanting the slow, corrupt government 
legal system with methods that are profoundly appropriate to the 
traditional fabric of Afghan society.52 Next, the Taliban have been 
refining their shadow or parallel civil administration structures, 
increasing their capacities by forming formal commissions that 
appoint qualified civil servants and improving organizational 
efficiency to promote uniform, effective governance.53 Finally, the 
Taliban have reformed some of their social policies that had been 
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particularly unpopular in the areas where the group has influence. 
The most notable of these reforms has been the Taliban’s response 
toward state-provided education, which they have conceded to 
allow as long as they have oversight over a given school’s staff and 
curriculum. Girls, reportedly, now even make up fifteen percent of 
the student populations in the schools permitted by the Taliban.54  
 The focus of recent Taliban actions supports the narrative that 
their return to power is inevitable and that they will implement an 
Islamic regime that is inclusive and tolerant of all Afghans. Their 
highly visible and seemingly unimpeded actions on Kabul’s 
doorstep provide a signal to both the Afghan public and the 
international community that control of the country is within the 
Taliban’s grasp. Furthermore, increased operations in the North 
dramatically enhance this image of gaining momentum and lend 
credibility to the perception that the Taliban is a legitimate national 
movement that resonates with demographics beyond its Pashtun 
base. Finally, demonstrated actions to improve governance and 
increase political capital send a clear message to the Taliban’s 
audiences that the organization aims to provide a fair, effective, and 
moderate regime alternative that caters to moral values common 
throughout the county.  
 
Weaknesses of the Taliban’s Narrative 
 
While the Taliban have attempted to convince the Afghan 
people and the international community of an imminent return to 
power and plans for effective Islamic governance, there are many 
inconsistencies portrayed in the organization’s words and actions. 
Taliban statements aim to promote a narrative of strength, yet the 
content of those very statements also reveal key vulnerabilities and 
desperation. The group also intends that its narrative inspires hope 
for a future where Afghans will live in a moderate Islamic society 
that is inclusive of all the country’s tribes and ethnicities, but the 
realities on the ground show that the Taliban can be as brutal as 
ever. These inconsistencies are further matched by evidence that 
the Taliban’s leadership and administration is full of fissures, 
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communications gaps, and differing priorities. All of these factors 
combined leave a narrative packed with very significant 
weaknesses.   
The Taliban’s assertion that they are on the cusp of unseating 
the Kabul government is undermined by statements reflecting the 
group’s uncertain ability to overcome the capabilities of a well-
resourced Afghan government and the ANSF. For example, the 
2010 layeha, while mainly focused on moderating the Taliban’s 
behavior toward local people, also dwells on the threat of convoys 
supplying valuable resources to the Kabul administration and 
threatens anyone who contributes to these efforts with death.55 
Likewise, Mullah Omar’s act of acknowledging and specifically 
denouncing the recent United States-Afghanistan Strategic 
Partnership Agreement in his latest Eid message indicates the 
weight of the danger that a prolonged U.S. commitment to Afghan 
security poses to the Taliban. Finally, the Taliban’s recent creation 
of an organization to promote the defection of Afghan government 
employees and security forces, which  Mullah Omar calls the 
department of “Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration,” shows 
that the Taliban are still searching for the organizational capacity 
and manpower required to consolidate their power.56 The subtext of 
these recent Taliban communications is that the group still faces a 
crisis of confidence in its prospects for achieving its desired end-
state. 
The Taliban’s focus on improving its administrative efficiency 
is also accompanied with underlying expressions of doubt 
regarding harmony within the organization’s chain of command. It 
is well-known that the Taliban have had trouble since the beginning 
of their insurgency in addressing the dynamics of incorporating 
groups with varying tribal ties, leaders with different agendas, 
foreign fighters, and radical young clerics that are less politically-
savvy than the organization’s founders.57 Ruptures in the Taliban 
leadership have sometimes reached the public eye, including the 
2010 arrest of Mullah Baradar, Mullah Omar’s deputy, by Pakistani 
authorities after the relationship between the two leaders had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Johnson and DuPee,"Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct,” 84. 
56 “Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Eid al-Fitr Address for 2012.” 
57 Ruttig, “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency,” 28. 
reportedly soured. Consequently, recent Taliban messages, such as 
the 2010 layeha, portray a tremendous preoccupation with 
preserving the group’s cohesion and ability to maintain a 
functioning structure of command, control, and communications.58 
As the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in 2014 will increase the 
likelihood of power-vacuum, possible cleavages in the Taliban 
could continue to become more visible and detrimental to a 
population that is very perceptive of authority that lacks unity and 
uniformity.  
Finally, and most importantly, the unrelenting widespread 
atrocities committed by Taliban soldiers continually nullify all 
rhetoric and actions focused on portraying the group as national 
heroes or anything that could pass as a tolerant, inclusive, or 
moderate Islamic organization. Even after the 2010 layeha 
denounced hostage-taking for ransom, kidnapping increased 
dramatically in Kandahar province. Worse atrocities, such as 
beheadings and the mutilation of Afghan villagers as punishment, 
show a major disconnect between the moderate values of the 
Taliban’s new narrative and the realities on the ground. Finally, 
rampant thievery and corruption at both the foot-soldier and 
leadership levels has also increased, diminishing perceptions that 
the group would present a more just and efficient alternative to the 
current Kabul government.59  
 
Can We Turn the Tide?  Areas of Focus for Countering the 
Taliban’s Narrative 
 
Despite the past inability of the United States and the Afghan 
government to pose a simple, unified, effective narrative to inspire 
the support of the Afghan population, the opportunity still remains 
for countering the Taliban’s message with a strong alternative 
storyline. The approach to doing so must be three-pronged:  First, 
the United States needs to support the Afghan government to 
publicly reveal the many inconsistencies and weaknesses of the 
Taliban’s present narrative through effective IO. Secondly, the 
Afghan government must continue to expose flaws in the Taliban 
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narrative by engaging the group in open debate over their vision for 
improving governance in Afghanistan. Lastly, the Afghan 
government must present its own solid narrative, supported by both 
words and actions that resonate with the traditions and culture of 
the people, which promotes hope for a peaceful, prosperous 
Afghanistan. 
 IO conducted by the United States and the Afghan government 
needs to portray the Taliban’s narrative of promoting a moderate, 
tolerant, Islamic regime as a collection of outright lies that are 
reinforced by sinful acts committed against Afghan people. There 
is a plethora of regularly-employed Taliban tactics that run counter 
to both Afghan sensibilities and the principles of IslamThese range 
from deadly suicide bombings at weddings and funeral gatherings 
to supporting the illegal drug trade through poppy cultivation. 
There are also plenty of instances where communication 
disconnects and differing ideologies among the Taliban’s 
leadership result in acts that specifically contradict guidance 
portrayed in the latest layeha and Eid messages, such as the 
numerous school burnings and kidnappings.  U.S. and Afghan IO 
must be quick to draw attention to these transgressions, and they 
must draw parallels between the current Taliban actions and the 
much-despised behavior of the former Taliban government.60 
 Drawing the Taliban into open debate about their vision for 
Afghanistan’s future would further reveal the weaknesses of the 
Taliban narrative and would give the Afghan government a chance 
to shine in promoting hope for a better future. The Taliban 
narrative clearly lacks thoughtful, concrete plans for running a 
government, outside of their vague notions of improving the 
administration of local justice systems. Additionally, if more 
Taliban leaders could be brought into a public forum to discuss 
their ideas for governance, their statements would likely contradict 
each other and reveal the group’s lack of coherence. Finally, open 
debate with the Taliban would encourage Afghan government 
leaders to be more active and project a greater public presence in 
those areas of the country where the Taliban are most competitive 
for the support of the local people. To steal legitimacy from the 
Taliban, elected officials and bureaucrats must demonstrate 
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understanding of local grievances and needs, show resolve toward 
solving them, and inspire trust that the Afghan government will 
provide a future of peace, prosperity, and the preservation of 
Afghan values.61 
 The Afghan government must finally take ownership of a 
narrative of its own that appeals to the common pride Afghans hold 
in their traditions, religion, and identity. This narrative must 
highlight efforts the Afghan government has taken to improve 
peace, stability, and prosperity in the country, but must also be 
accompanied with further visible efforts to reduce the corruption, 
inefficiency, and lack of transparency that plagues the country. The 
Afghan government’s message must also manage expectations 
toward a path that will long and challenging for the country and 
must seek to demonstrate that the government has a sense of 
ownership for the process of creating Afghanistan’s future after the 
withdrawal of the ISAF forces. Most importantly, the Afghan 
government’s narrative needs to effectively promote nationalism, 
reconciliation, and unity. After thirty years of war, the constant 
dividing forces that have plagued the country, and the many 
sources of pain that have been common to all Afghans, the 





In a war that depends heavily on the battle of narratives, the 
Taliban have been extremely successful in promoting a message to 
the Afghan people and the international community that the future 
is theirs.  The group has masterfully and consistently spread strong, 
simple, and culturally appropriate storylines that appeal to the 
deeply religious, cultural, and political sensibilities of tribal rural 
Afghans. Meanwhile, the Taliban have also strengthened their 
claim to legitimacy and demonstrated their potential for governance 
by creating administrative and legal bodies that now easily 
outperform the inefficient, corrupt, or absent institutions of the 
Kabul government. Finally, the Taliban have refocused their 
operations on the ground, demonstrating relentless resolve toward 
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threatening Afghanistan’s capitol and surrounding areas, while also 
tempering and reforming their behavior toward Afghan villagers 
that have always been critical of the Taliban’s brutal tactics and 
strict social restrictions. All of these approaches combined have 
revealed that the Taliban are now telling all of their various 
audiences that their return to power is imminent after U.S. combat 
troops withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, and that they will 
implement an Islamic regime that is inclusive and tolerant of all 
Afghans.62  
 While the U.S. military and the Afghan government have 
consistently failed to present a competitive narrative to the Afghan 
people since the rise of the Taliban insurgency, the chance to turn 
the tide has not expired. Now, as the United States prepares to draw 
down its forces and return the complete control of Afghanistan to 
its government, the time and the opportunity has never been more 
appropriate for the Afghan government to create a strong narrative 
of its own. After all, the storyline of the Taliban is full of 
inconsistencies and flaws that signal weaknesses in the group’s true 
ability to overcome the capability of the Afghan government and 
security forces. This is an opening to amplify doubt that they will 
remain a cohesive organization, and are willing to move beyond 
their past brutality to form a moderate government that is truly 
representative of the most commonly-held Afghan values. For 
Afghanistan to move forward, the government must focus on 
themes of nationalism, reconciliation, unity, and hope, to send a 
strong message that the Afghan government will someday provide 
a stable, peaceful, and prosperous future for its country. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Taliban Messaging Strategy for Local Afghan Populations 
that are Neutral/Undecided toward the Taliban’s Cause63 
 
Taliban strategy: Informational/Educational, Persuasion, Coercion.  
Taliban objectives:  To succeed in eliciting a local community’s 
compliance with Taliban demands to end its 
relationship with the current government structure and 
to disengage from the influence and outreach of foreign 
forces.  
Narratives used:  Islamic, Cultural, and Political  
Major themes 
used:  
• Coalition/ISAF forces are exactly the same as the 
Soviet army that invaded Afghanistan in the 
1980s. 
• Coalition/ISAF forces employ the same tactics as 
the Soviet Army: bombing villages, “killing 
everyone,” targeting civilians because they cannot 
distinguish between civilians and mujahideen. 
• Coalition/ISAF speaks of peace and 
reconstruction but these are lies.  
• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, 
spilling the blood of men, women and children 
alike.  
• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the United 
States is, money and superior weaponry cannot 
defeat the will of the Afghan people. 
• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and 
attempt to spread Christianity and proselytize for 
it.  
• The Coalition is facing a military defeat. 
• Morale and resources among the mujahideen are 
at an all time high. 
• Afghans have defeated Alexander’s armies, the 
British, the Soviets and now the US and NATO. 
• The Taliban is planning for the future of this 
country after the occupation “under the shade of 
social justice of Islam, with economic and social 
development programs.” 
Message • Exploiting the failures or deficiencies of the 
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Effectiveness: current Afghan government structure, issues of 
abuse and corruption, and the perceived predatory 
nature of the Afghan security services.  
• Exploiting collateral damage, especially from 
errant airstrikes or night-raids conducted by 
foreign forces.  
• Portraying U.S. and NATO forces as occupiers 
and comparing them to colonial occupiers or the 
Soviet forces resonates among most communities.  
• Expanding and strategically shaping linguistic 
delivery capabilities. (For instance, the Taliban 
disseminated videos of religious sermons spoken 
in Dari and Pashto compared to previous offerings 
only available in Arabic.)  
• Afghan media/journalists are being manipulated 




• Local opposition to terrorism, especially suicide-
terrorism.  
• Redundant and negative messaging campaign 
induces audience fatigue.  
• Contradictory statements between senior and mid-
level command (in public addresses, claims of 
responsibility, on negotiations, relations with al 
Qaeda, etc.) 
• Taliban attacks against civilians or attacks that 
maim and kill civilians are extremely unpalatable 
and unjustified according to Afghan popular public 
opinion. 
Delivery Systems:  Preachers, graffiti,  shabnamah, khutba (Friday 






Taliban Messaging Strategy for Afghan Local Populations that Support or 
Sympathize with the Taliban’s Cause64  
 
Taliban strategy: Informational/Educational. 
Narratives used:  Islamic, Cultural, and Political. 
Major themes 
used:  
• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, 
spilling the blood of men, women and children 
alike.  
• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the United 
States is, money and superior weaponry cannot 
defeat the will of the Afghan people. 
• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and 
attempt to spread Christianity and proselytize for 
it.  
• The Coalition is facing a military defeat. 
• Morale and resources among the mujahideen are 
at an all time high. 
• Afghans have defeated Alexander’s armies, the 
British, the Soviets and now the US and NATO. 
• Taliban victory is inevitable and certain. 
Message 
Effectiveness: 
• Messages are delivered with a level of linguistic 
mastery and resonance. 
• Convincing usage of contemporary folklore, 
collective memory of past Afghan victories 
(Soviet-Afghan jihad, anti-colonial jihad).  
• Utilizes and exploits shared Islamic identity 
among Afghans; effectively uses cultural tenants 
of pride, shame, and righteousness to convey 
messages.  
• Islamic rhetoric aims to convince participants that 
their actions in jihad will be rewarded dually in 
the afterlife if individuals are killed in combat 
(shaheed).  
• Messages are designed to uphold and increase 




Confusion from inconsistent messaging from 
leadership, erroneous or competing statements 
from official spokesmen, or from rival insurgent 
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factions (HIG).  
Delivery Systems:  Layeha (“rules and regulations for mujahedeen” 
field book), graffiti, DVDs, periodicals, khutba 
(Friday sermons), poetry, taranas (poetic chants), 
face to face interactions, internet websites/forums, 





Taliban Messaging Strategy for Afghan Local Populations that are 
Opposed to the Taliban’s Cause65 
 
Taliban strategy: Threats and Intimidation, Coercion, Persuasion.  
Narratives used:  Islamic, Cultural, Political.  
Major themes 
used:  
• Those who work with the current Afghan regime 
or international forces are munafiq (hypocrites), 
zalem (cruel/tyrannical), zulum (tyranny), ghulam 
(slaves/servants), be-ghairat (dishonorable, 
cowardly),  be-ābrū (dishonor, disgrace, 
indignity) and/or gaudagai (puppets).  
• If you are not supporting the Taliban, then you are 
supporting the oppressors. 
• You, as a Muslim, must join with the Taliban to 
evict the invading army so sharia law can be 
reestablished under the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban government). 
• Coalition/ISAF simply targets all Afghans, 
spilling the blood of men, women and children 
alike.  
• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the United 
States is, money and superior weaponry cannot 
defeat the will of the Afghan people. 
• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and 
attempt to spread Christianity and proselytize for 
it.  
• The Coalition is facing a certain military defeat. 
Message 
Effectiveness: 
• The usage of threats followed by violent actions 
can be effective in eroding local support for 
government structures and services and helps 
portray the local government as ineffective and 
powerless.  
• Persuasive messages include referring to local 
strongmen as mujahedeen to help reach out to 
those who fought in previous eras  
Message 
Ineffectiveness: 
• Message consumption is usually limited since 
those opposed to the Taliban do not seek out 
communications with or distributed by the overall 
Taliban structure.  
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• Confusion from inconsistent messaging from 
Taliban leadership, erroneous or competing 
statements from official spokesmen, or from rival 
insurgent factions (HIG). 
• Difficulty in discerning the authenticity of 
communications from Taliban representatives.  
Delivery Systems: Shabnamah, (night-letters), graffiti, khutba (Friday 




























Taliban Messaging Strategy for Populations of Neighboring/Muslim 
Countries66 
 
Taliban strategy: Threats and Intimidation, Coercion, Persuasion.  
Narratives used:  Islamic, Cultural, Political.  
Major themes 
used:  
• You, as a Muslim, must join with the Taliban to 
evict the invading army so sharia law can be 
reestablished under the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan (i.e. the Taliban government). 
• Those who work with the current Afghan regime 
or international forces are munafiq (hypocrites), 
zalem (cruel/tyrannical), zulum (tyranny), ghulam 
(slaves/servants), be-ghairat (dishonorable, 
cowardly),  be-ābrū (dishonor, disgrace, 
indignity) and/or gaudagai (puppets).  
• If you are not supporting the Taliban, then you are 
supporting the oppressors. 
• The U.S. attacks Muslims worldwide, spilling the 
blood of men, women and children alike.  
• No matter how resourceful and wealthy the United 
States is, money and superior weaponry cannot 
defeat the will of the mujahedeen. 
• The occupiers despise the values of Islam and 
attempt to spread Christianity and proselytize for 
it.  
• The Coalition is facing a certain military defeat. 
Message 
Effectiveness: 
• Themes highlighting U.S. oppression, aggression 
toward Muslims, and “the righteous cause of 
jihad” resonate widely among the regional 
population.  
• Persuasive messages include referring to local 
strongmen as mujahedeen to help reach out to 
those who fought in previous eras in an effort to 
have them rejoin a “righteous” cause.  
Message 
Ineffectiveness: 
• Confusion from inconsistent messaging from 
Taliban leadership, especially regarding pro or 
anti-Pakistani government sentiments, erroneous 
or competing statements from official spokesmen, 
or from rival insurgent factions. 
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• Difficulty in discerning the authenticity of 
communications from Taliban representatives.  
Delivery Systems: DVDs, periodicals, khutba (Friday sermons), face to 
face interactions, poetry, taranas (poetic chants), 
internet websites/forums, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 






Taliban Messaging Strategy for Populations of International/Non-Muslim 
Countries67 
 
Taliban strategy: Education, Persuasion, Threats and Intimidation, 
Narratives used:  Islamic, Cultural, Political.  
Delivery Systems: Internet websites/forums, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
periodicals, influence operations that target western 
and international media outlets.  
 
Differences between International Media Statements and Regional/Local 
Articles 
 
International (English) Regional/Local 
Primarily focuses on U.S. foreign 
policy developments (in 
Afghanistan); offers few 
statements directly against the 
European Union.  
Primarily focuses on domestic Afghan 
events, news, actors, and policies. 
Offers some broader articles focusing 
on the international Islamic 
community.  
Democracy Exercise of power/Military 
Achievement  
Decries “human rights abuses” 
caused by foreign military 
operations; collateral damage.  
Increased use of nationalistic terms 
such as the Afghan Nation, “invaders,” 
and “puppet government” while 
referring to themselves (the Taliban) as 
mujahideen.  
Describes the West as being the 
aggressor, the Afghan population 
as the victim of this aggression.  
Almost no use of the term Kafir 
“infidel” whereas this term is 
frequently used in Taliban night-letters 
at the village and district level. 
Indicates the Taliban movement 
poses no threat to the international 
or regional community.  
Offers articles concerning the 
Hijab/Women’s Rights related articles 
(criticizes the prohibition of the Hijab 
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